Regulating to Achieve Stability in the Domain of High-Frequency Trading by Crump, Lindsey C.
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 1
2015
Regulating to Achieve Stability in the Domain of
High-Frequency Trading
Lindsey C. Crump
University of Michigan Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons,
and the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation





STABILITY IN THE DOMAIN OF HIGH-
FREQUENCY TRADING
Lindsey C. Crump1
Cite as: Lindsey C. Crump, Regulating to Achieve
Stability in the Domain of High-Frequency Trading,
22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 161 (2015).
This manuscript may be accessed online at repository.law.umich.edu.
ABSTRACT
High-frequency trading has become a darling of capital markets de-
bate. This debate thrives because the true and long-lasting effects of
high-frequency trading are still unknown. On one hand, high-frequency
trading evidences recent and powerful advances in trading technology;
on the other, it is said to harness speed at the expense of fairness,
prudence, and stability. In part because of this duality, the regulation
of high-frequency trading in the United States has been slow to de-
velop. Other nations, however, have been quicker to react and to pro-
mulgate laws that directly, or indirectly, affect high-frequency trading.
This Note explores the legal responses to high-frequency trading
across a multitude of nations. Drawing on insights from this global
landscape, it proposes domestic structural reforms—such as a variable
tick size regime, discrete call markets, and experimental order taxes—
that would allow the positive potential of high-frequency trading to be
realized, while minimizing its impact upon market stability.
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INTRODUCTION
“As soon as you realize that you are not able to execute your orders
because someone else is able to identify what you are trying to do
and race ahead of you to the other exchanges, it’s over,” he said. “It
changes your mind.” He stewed on the situation; the longer he
stewed, the angrier he became.
“It really just pissed me off,” he said. “That people set out in this
way to make money from everyone else’s retirement account. I
knew who was being screwed, people like my mom and pop, and I
became hell-bent on figuring out who was doing the screwing.”2
The quote above is from Michael Lewis’s novel Flash Boys, depicting
an interview with John Schwall, the Chief Operating Officer of Investors
Exchange.3 John is a former day trader who grew disillusioned with Wall
2. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 95 (2014).
3. IEX was formed by trader Brad Katsuyama as a response to concerns about the
negative impact of HFT on the market. See Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, IEX to Apply
for Exchange Status, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iex-to-apply-
for-exchange-status-1409709842.
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Street and the perceived effects of high-frequency trading (“HFT”) on capi-
tal markets.4
Everyone has an opinion on HFT. Critics insist it is predatory and sys-
tematically fraudulent.5 Proponents caution that its benefits far outweigh any
negative impact it may have on the market.6 The dissemination of insider
accounts like Flash Boys—which confidently proclaims HFT to be the de-
struction of the stock market—has fueled public fervor for reform or elimi-
nation of HFT.
In short order, American federal and state agencies have responded with
HFT-targeted lawsuits and proclamations. Furthermore, HFT now traverses
the modern world, with reactionary regulations cropping up across Europe
and Asia. Even amid agency reassurances that HFT should not be summarily
dismissed as dangerous,7 enforcement against high-frequency traders (“HF-
Traders”) has increased, seemingly because regulators recognize some in-
trinsic harm caused by HFT.
This Note presents and analyzes recent legal responses to HFT, and pro-
poses that more proactive regulation should be implemented. Part I in-
troduces HFT and related trading strategies. Part II examines current HFT
regulatory structures both domestically and abroad, as well as recent HFT-
related litigation in the United States. Part III puts forth potential structural
reforms at a national level—such as variable tick sizes, discrete call markets,




There is no uniform definition for HFT,8 likely because there is no sin-
gular, definitive HFT strategy. In the U.S., HFT is considered a subset of
4. See Jim Edwards, How Knowledge of Credit Suisse’s Dark Pool For High-Fre-
quency Trading Leaked Out On LinkedIn, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2014).
5. See, e.g., Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen., Robert Abrams Public Service
Lecture at New York Law School: High-Frequency Trading & Insider Trading 2.0 (Mar. 18,
2014) (transcript available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/HFT_and_market_structure.pdf) (as-
serting that high-frequency traders use technologic advantages to obtain information at a speed
that is harmful to competitors).
6. See Alice K. Ross et al., Robot Wars: How High Frequency Trading Changed
Global Markets, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.thebur
eauinvestigates.com/2012/09/16/robot-wars-how-high-frequency-trading-changed-global-mar
kets (citing support for HFT in reduced trading costs and increased market activity).
7. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at Sandler O’Neill Global Exchange
and Brokerage Conference: Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure (June 5, 2014); Martin
Wheatley, Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Conduct Auth., Address at the Global Exchange and Bro-
kerage Conference: Regulating High Frequency Trading (Apr. 6, 2014).
8. See SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606–09,
(Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
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strategies within algorithmic trading—or “[c]omputerized trading controlled
by algorithms.”9 Algorithmic trading is a more general practice within com-
puter-based trading where a programmer designs software that implements a
rule-based trading decision to be triggered when specific conditions are met
within the market. Human involvement in algorithmic trading is mostly lim-
ited to the creation and implementation of the algorithms.10 Within al-
gorithmic trading, HFT strategies are those that send orders into the market
at high speeds and utilize short holding periods relative to other trading strat-
egies.11 HFT gained traction as technological advances increased the speed
and efficiency with which trades could be executed. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) characterizes HFTraders as “professional trad-
ers acting in a proprietary capacity that engage in strategies that generate a
large number of trades on a daily basis.”12 These HFTraders are proprietary
because they trade with their own capital—not a client’s—and might be in-
dependent firms, or broker-dealer desks within larger firms or hedge funds.13
B. The Technology
One way to conceptualize HFT is the application of new technologies to
existing trading strategies.14 Successful HFTraders must have technology
that enables them to (1) process information as quickly, or quicker, than
their competitors, and (2) reliably differentiate between valuable and value-
less securities and respond appropriately.15
A primary HFT strategy is achieving and employing low latency—or
reduced time delay for receiving, analyzing, and transmitting information
and orders. Commentators refer to this as the “race to zero” because every
innovative strategy or technological development that lowers latency inevi-
tably becomes the industry’s new benchmark.16 Latency in HFT can be re-
duced by both technological and physical means. Technological
9. Johannes Prix et al., Algorithmic Trading Patterns in Xetra Orders, 13 EUR. J. FIN
717, 717 (2007).
10. Charles M. Jones, What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading? 18 (Colum-
bia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 13-11, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2236201.
11. See JONATHAN A. BROGAARD, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON MAR-
KET QUALITY, 67 (2010), available at http://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/10463/Jonathan_
Brogaard_Paper.pdf.
12. SEC Release, supra note 8, at 3606.
13. Id.; Capgemini, High Frequency Trading: Evolution and the Future 6 (2012), https://
www.capgemini.com/resource-file-access/resource/pdf/High_Frequency_Trading__Evolution
_and_the_Future.pdf.
14. See SEC Release, supra note 8, at 3607.
15. See CAPGEMINI, supra note 13.
16. See Scott Patterson, High-Speed Stock Traders Turn to Laser Beams, Wall St. J.
(Feb. 11, 2014). See also Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability at the Bank of Eng.,
Speech at the International Economic Association Sixteenth World Congress: Race to Zero
(July 8, 2011).
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innovations—such as fiber optics,17 field programmable gate arrays,18 and
increased bandwidth19—allow HFTraders to send and receive data more
quickly than previously possible.  Physically locating servers in close prox-
imity to exchanges (a practice known as “colocation”) decreases the distance
that data must travel, allowing HFTraders to wring out an edge of mere
milliseconds over competitors.20
While speed is important, it is only half of the equation. HFTraders must
also constantly reprogram their algorithms to better “differentiate”—or ana-
lyze market information and craft order responses to real-world events.
Competitive differentiation prevents competitors from using reverse engi-
neering to decipher one’s algorithms and uncover one’s trading strategies.21
However, constant reprogramming opens the door to more frequent mistakes
in algorithm execution. Since there is less time for testing and sniffing out
programming bugs, it is more likely that a rogue algorithm or a “fat finger”
incident will occur.22  Such errors can snowball into selloffs that can devas-
tate a company or even an entire market.23
17. See CAPGEMINI, supra note 13, at 12. The private construction of fiber optic cables
physically connecting distant markets is one example of such infrastructure, e.g. Chicago to
New York or New York to London. These million dollar projects have been constructed solely
to shorten the journey—essentially traveling from point A to point B as the crow flies instead
of winding along highways and other pre-existing routes. Yet even these investments have
been rendered essentially obsolete with the subsequent introduction of micro- and millimeter
wave technology. See, e.g., Christopher Steiner, Wall Street’s Speed War, FORBES (Sept. 9,
2010); Matthew Philips, Cable Across Atlantic Aims to Save Traders Milliseconds, BLOOM-
BERG (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-29/cable-across-at-
lantic-aims-to-save-traders-milliseconds; Patterson, supra note 16; Elaine Wah, Michael Lewis
Says the Market’s Rigged. But His ‘Flash Boys’ Rigged Themselves, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/04/michael-lewis-market-rigged-
flash-boys-high-speed-trading.
18. Field programmable gate arrays are a recently adopted technology involving inte-
grated circuits designed to handle high performance computing, specifically related to al-
gorithmic functions of speed and repetition that lend lower latency to HFT firms. See
CAPGEMINI, supra note 13, at 12.
19. Like your internet at home, traders with more bandwidth can send larger amounts of
data at high speeds—thus increasing their “data transfer rate”—between networks. See
CAPGEMINI, supra note 13, at 12.
20. See Tom Groenfedlt, HFN Offers The Fastest Data Feeds — From Mahwah,
FORBES (NOV. 4, 2013).
21. See CAPGEMINI, supra note 13, at 12.
22. A “fat finger” error is a human error made by pressing the wrong key, or the right
key too many or too few times, causing an unintended trade. See Fat Finger Error, INVES-
TOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fat-finger-error.asp (last visited April 13,
2015). To curb accidental algorithmic mayhem, regulators have introduced circuit breakers
that temporarily cut off a trader or a stock if abnormal trading patterns are detected. See SEC,
INVESTOR BULLETIN: NEW MEASURES TO ADDRESS MARKET VOLATILITY (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakersbulletin.htm.
23. See Alexandria Stevenson, Knight Capital to Pay $12 Million Fine on Trading Vio-
lations, N.Y. TIMES: THE DEALBOOK (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/10/16/knight-capital-to-pay-12-million-fine-on-trading-violations (describing the near
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C. The Strategies
HFTraders profit on short-term trades—rather than long-term invest-
ments—through the tried-and-true strategy of buying low and selling high.
With the relatively recent advent of computer-driven algorithmic trading, the
spread between a trader’s high and low prices has shrunk to pennies.24 The
most profitable strategies in today’s markets aim to collect as many of those
pennies as possible.
1. Market Making Strategies
As a traditional trading strategy, market making involves profiting on
the bid-ask spread. “Market makers” transact on both sides of a trade—post-
ing an offer to sell (ideally higher than market price) and a bid to buy (ide-
ally lower than market price). Market makers are valued because they bring
liquidity to the markets and minimize the bid-ask spread—two elements that
are considered indicative of a healthy capital market. Liquidity in a market
exists when traders are able to make trades easily, quickly, and without af-
fecting the market. The larger the order a market can fill at a particular price,
the more liquid (and efficient) the market. Smaller bid-ask spreads evidence
overall market health by implying that the stock is trading competitively.25
Such competition can be inferred from traders’ willingness to trade on a
stock despite its relatively small profit margins.26
Many trading platforms structure themselves to attract market-making
HFTraders. HFTraders are desirable customers, because the platforms profit
from trade volume and HFTraders trade quickly and often.27 One strategy for
attracting HFTraders is the pricing model of “maker-taker” rebates. In this
model, the trader who posts the trade (the “maker”) collects a small rebate
when the trade is executed. The trader who accepts the posted trade (the
“taker”) pays a small fee to execute. The exchange platform profits on the
difference between fee and rebate.
Rebate collection became a particularly profitable strategy for market
makers in large part due to the SEC’s 2005 promulgation of Regulation Na-
tional Market System (“Reg NMS”) and its “trade-through rule.”28 The
trade-through rule requires that every order be executed at the best price
bankruptcy of Knight Capital after a technological glitch resulted in market-wide disruption
and a $460 million loss to the firm).
24. See note about decimalization infra Part III.A.i.
25. See e.g., Jeff Castura et al., Market Efficiency and Microstructure Evolution in U.S.
Equity Markets: A High-Frequency Perspective 3 (Aug. 30, 2010), http://finance.wharton.u
penn.edu/department/Seminar/micro/Litzenberger_transient_vol5_2010.pdf.
26. See, e.g., id.
27. See SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS 4-8 (2012).
28. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,496–98 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249, & 270) (June 29, 2005) [hereinafter Reg. NMS].
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available on any trading center.29 When a platform cannot execute the order
at the best price, it must either route it to another trading center displaying
the best price or cancel and return the order.30 The trade-through rule essen-
tially “imposes a mandatory . . . low price guarantee—trading venues are
required to match or beat their competitors’ prices.”31 Knowing orders will
be matched on their platform only if they have the superior price, exchanges
seek to increase liquidity and capture the lowest prices by inducing traders—
with rebates—to submit resting “maker” orders to their exchange.
2. Opportunistic Strategies
Some less revered trading strategies are described as opportunistic:
when a trader profits not from market making, but from exploiting market
inefficiencies. HFTraders employ a strategy known as arbitrage through al-
gorithms designed to “capture pricing inefficiencies between related prod-
ucts or markets.”32 Despite being labeled “opportunistic,” arbitrage is
functionally one of the most effective means of creating an efficient and
healthy market.
Pairs trading is one example of arbitrage strategy. HFTraders using this
strategy identify complementary stocks using data mining and statistics,33
and then use algorithms to predict changes in one stock’s performance on
the basis of the other stock’s performance.34 Pairs trading is beneficial be-
cause it improves price efficiency by transferring liquidity from an active
stock to a stagnant stock.
Low latency also makes possible another practice known as latency ar-
bitrage. When a firm receives information faster than another firm, it can
trade against competitors who are now relying upon “stale” information. A
firm achieving lower latency is able to recognize price discrepancies sooner
and adjust its trading strategy to claim that profit.
Using different arbitrage strategies, HFTraders can even out price dis-
crepancies across the market. The faster this process occurs, the faster stock
29. See SEC Release, supra note 8, at 3601. As per the SEC, Rule 611 provides a
baseline assurance that: (1) Marketable orders will receive at least the best displayed price,
regardless of the particular trading center that exe-cutes the order or where the best price is
displayed in the national market system; and (2) quotations that are displayed at one trading
center will not be bypassed by trades with inferior prices at any trading center in the national
market system. Trading centers include “all exchanges, all ATSs (including ECNs and dark
pools), all [Over the Counter] market makers, and any other broker-dealer that executes orders
internally . . .” Id.
30. Id.
31. Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH.
L. REV. 523, 536-37 (2014).
32. SEC Release, supra note 8, at 3608.
33. EDGAR PEREZ, THE SPEED TRADERS 19 (2011).
34. Id.
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prices reflect the real value of the underlying assets.35 The logical inference
is that not all opportunistic strategies are necessarily harmful strategies. Reg-
ulators and academics have spent considerable time analyzing how to help
these HFTraders remain profitable—so that they might continue innovating
and improving market efficiency—while delineating the truly unfair and an-
ticompetitive practices outlined below.
3. Market Manipulation and Other “Predatory” Strategies
Market manipulation is deliberate, and illegal, interference with the fair-
ness of the market to create artificial, false, or misleading appearances with
respect to the price of a security. Though not necessarily illegal, a trading
strategy is predatory when trader X influences market conditions to X’s ben-
efit and trader Y’s detriment.
Within the realm of predatory trading exist order anticipation strategies.
To prevent undesirable price movement, institutional investors seek to dis-
guise large trades by breaking them up into smaller sets of trades. Order
anticipation strategies attempt to identify and trade ahead of those large, dis-
guised trades—known to HFTraders as “whales”—and then take advantage
of any resulting price movement. When this is accomplished by guessing, it
is the whale hunter’s good luck, sometimes called “wave-riding.” Wave-
riding is seen as a competitive, but not illegal (or even necessarily unfair),
trading strategy.36  In contrast, when anticipatory trading strategies rely on
reverse engineering of other traders’ algorithms and the misappropriation of
their trade information, it is considered HFT-style insider trading or “front-
running” and is patently illegal.37 Though order anticipation predates HFT,
HFTraders bring new sophistication to an old trick. HFTraders can “ping”
trading venues with small, rapid orders, and employ “sophisticated pattern
recognition software” to locate and trade ahead of hidden orders.38
Momentum ignition is another predatory, but definitively illegal strategy
through which traders attempt to influence market prices through schemes
35. “Real value” is a matter of some debate. Arbitrage unquestionably achieves infor-
mationally efficient prices, which is the result of accurately setting prices to reflect all publicly
available information. It is less clear that it achieves fundamentally efficient prices, or prices
that accurately reflect the true value of the stock’s underlying asset(s). Compare Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. OF FIN. 383,
383 (1970) (contending that “efficient” markets reflect all available information), with Burton
G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 59,
75 (2003) (noting that arbitrageurs have difficulty in determining a stock’s fundamental values
as well as in aligning its price with that value).
36. Adam Adler, High Frequency Regulation: A New Model for Market Monitoring, 39
VT. L. REV. 161, 175-76 (2014).
37. See SEC Release, supra note 8, at 3609; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
38. Korsmo, supra note 31, at 548.
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such as spoofing39 or quote stuffing.40 When spoofing, an HFTrader feigns
interest in trading at a certain price by placing large orders, creating the
illusion of demand in order to artificially move prices. The trader then
cancels the original trades before they are executed and takes advantage of
the resulting market distortion by buying or selling at the new, more desira-
ble price. Quote stuffing involves placing orders and immediately canceling
them in large enough quantities to clog the market’s information pipes, os-
tensibly to create arbitrage opportunities or a relative speed advantage
through one’s own, unaffected processing power. Like order anticipation,
momentum ignition closely resembles classic forms of market manipulation
with the addition of new levels of HFT sophistication. The lack of discern-
able lines between manipulative and legitimate—even if seemingly preda-
tory—patterns of trading in the HFT context can make it difficult to identify
illegal behavior or transactions.41
II. HFT REGULATION AROUND THE WORLD
The tangible ramifications of HFT are still being studied, and regulators
continue to contemplate lawmaking that will both harness the benefits and
reduce the risks of HFT. Regulatory responses to HFT indicate that regula-
tors are most concerned with the fairness and stability of national and global
financial markets. Currently there is no uniform global approach to HFT
regulation. The next section will take a closer look at the varying attitudes
toward regulation and enforcement of HFT activity in several key geo-
graphic areas, including the United States, the European Union, and Asia.42
A. United States
In the wake of ample concern about the effects of HFT on the market,
the SEC has voiced its intent to increase and improve market monitoring,43
and it has brought several high-profile lawsuits against HFT “offenders.”44
39. See Andrew Harris & Matthew Leising, High-Speed Trader Accused of Commodity
Market ‘Spoofing’, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-10-02/high-speed-trader-accused-of-commodity-market-spoofing-.
40. See Quote Stuffing Definition, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/
q/quote-stuffing (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
41. See Korsmo, supra note 31, at 548-49.
42. This paper approaches HFT reform from a regulatory perspective, but does not as-
sume that exchange-level reform would be undesirable or ineffective. If meaningful reform
occurred at the exchange-level, a larger regulatory approach would likely look quite different
than the approaches advocated herein.
43. Scott Patterson, SEC Chairman Targets Dark Pools, High-Speed Trading, WALL.
ST. J. (JUNE 6, 2014).
44. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. Schneiderman, supra note 5; see also John Mc-
Crank, Exclusive: SEC Targets Ten Firms in High Frequency Trading Probe - SEC Document,
REUTERS (July 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/17/us-sec-investigation-high
frequencytradin-idUSKBN0FM2TW20140717.
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In addition to the SEC, agencies such as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) have levied fines and criminal charges against HFTraders. Not all
regulatory messages regarding HFT, however, proclaim its dangers. For ex-
ample, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that “[e]mpirical evidence shows
that investors are doing better in today’s algorithmic marketplace than they
did in the old manual markets.”45
The next section reviews current and forthcoming legislation related to
HFT to further analyze regulatory beliefs and intentions. This Note then
tracks recent HFT litigation—in the context of Market Access Rule viola-
tions and manipulative trading activity—to explore law enforcement’s func-
tional reaction to specific HFT strategies.
1. Legislation and Regulation
Trading in the U.S. financial market is governed at the federal level
predominantly by the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and the Commodity Exchange
Act (“CEA”), as well as by the ‘blue sky laws’ of various states.46 Generally,
traditional securities laws govern HFT by restricting or forbidding certain
trading behaviors. Since these laws were enacted long before the existence
of HFT, they do not contain HFT-specific restrictions.  In fact, the first piece
of federal legislation to acknowledge HFT was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”). Specific
provisions addressing HFT lie in Sections 747 and 967 of the Dodd-Frank
Act.
Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Act is modeled after Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. It amends Section 4c(a)(5) of the CEA (also known as the
“prohibited transactions” provision) to cover disruptive trading in futures
and derivatives markets.47 Soon after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
CFTC issued guidance on the new Section 4c(a)(5) of the CEA which speci-
fied the “intent” requirements for each prohibited transaction. According to
this guidance, the CFTC can, for the first time, bring an enforcement action
for market manipulation based on reckless conduct.48
45. White, supra note 7.
46. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 504-05 (Jean-Luc Soulier & Marcus
Best eds., 2d ed. 2005).
47. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C)
(2010)).
48. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31890 (May 28, 2013); see also
Thomas K. Cauley et al., Rules Against “Spoofing” and Other Disruptive Trading in Futures,
Swaps and Options, HEDGE FUND L. REPORT (Nov. 6, 2014) at 1, 1-2 (outlining the CFTC’s
determination of the intent requirements under the CEA as follows: it is a per se violation of
Section 4c(a)(5)(A) to violate bids or offers; a trader must show reckless disregard for orderly
executions of transactions during the closing period to violate Section 4c(a)(5)(B); and a trader
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Section 967 instructs the SEC to conduct a study on HFT in order to
determine how the SEC can best monitor the effects of HFT in the market.49
Although the SEC continues to mull over other elements of its regulatory
task, it has recently approved a FINRA rule revision that requires previously
unregistered HFTraders—“proprietary” traders, or HFTraders who trade
with their own capital, and the principals who supervise them—to register
with and submit to FINRA oversight.50
Members of the House and Senate have also introduced a number of
automated trading and HFT-specific proposals during the 113th Congress.51
Although none of the bills have yet to survive Congress, they demonstrate
that concerns about HFT and its effects have infiltrated committee and sub-
committee hearings in recent years. In spite of the dearth in HFT-specific
legislation, U.S. agencies like the SEC, CFTC, and Department of Justice
have announced legal actions against HFTraders under existing securities
laws.
2. Enforcement Actions
Federal agencies with the authority to bring enforcement actions have
focused much of their prosecutorial resources on Market Access Rule viola-
tions and market manipulation. These two violations will be discussed below
in the context of recent cases and settlements.
i. Market Access Rule Violations
The Market Access Rule52 requires registered firms—i.e. brokers and
dealers providing market access to other traders—to develop and maintain a
system to manage risks and supervise unregistered traders on their plat-
form.53 Currently, sophisticated customers seek direct or sponsored market
must show intent some degree beyond recklessness to violate Section 4c(a)(5)(C)’s prohibition
on spoofing).
49. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 967, 124 Stat. 1376, 1913 (2010).
50. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to Establish the Securities Trader and
Securities Trader Principal Registration Categories, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,369 (Sept. 3, 2015); see
also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rule to Require Broker-Deal-
ers Active in Off-Exchange Market to Become Members of National Securities Association
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-48.html; see also Andrew Acker-
man, SEC Rules Would Boost Oversight of High-Frequency Firms, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26,
2015); see generally Exemption for Certain Exchange Members, 80 Fed. Reg. 18036 (pro-
posed Apr. 2, 2015).
51. See, e.g., H.R. 2292, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 410, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 800,
113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 4413, 113th Cong. (2014).
52. Market Access Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5 (2010). The Market Access Rule is
commonly referred to as “Rule 15c3-5.”
53. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 Fed.
Reg. 69,792, 69,795 (Nov. 15, 2010). Such controls and procedures must: “[s]ystematically
limit financial exposure; comply with appropriate regulations; prevent entry of orders exceed-
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access in order to trade on a platform under the broker’s “market participant
identifier” (“MPID”) without the substantive involvement of the broker.54
Brokers are incentivized to allow such advanced access because the addi-
tional trading brings liquidity and revenue to their pools. The Market Access
Rule imposes supervisory obligations on the brokers—attempting to prevent
unregistered traders from gaining unfettered and unsupervised market ac-
cess, “so as not to jeopardize their own financial condition, that of other
market participants, the integrity of trading on the securities markets, and the
stability of the financial system.”55
The Wedbush and Facebook IPO enforcement actions below suggest
that brokers must be careful in their management of HFTraders’ powerful
algorithms and vigilant in their role as market gatekeepers.
In the Matter of Wedbush Securities (“Wedbush”)56
The SEC’s action against Wedbush Securities in June 2014 is one exam-
ple of an HFT firm caught in the crosshairs of the Market Access Rule. After
conducting an investigation, the SEC concluded that Wedbush failed to es-
tablish or impose any of the safeguards required by the Market Access Rule,
and as a result, HFTraders used Wedbush’s MPID to execute illegal trades.
These trades were completed because the firm allowed trade activity that
“did not flow through any Wedbush systems before reaching . . . trading
venues.”57 Wedbush ultimately agreed to pay a $2.44 million penalty and
agreed to retain an independent consultant to ensure future compliance with
the Market Access Rule.58
ing pre-set credit or capital thresholds; prevent entry of orders that appear to be erroneous;
ensure pre-trade compliance checks pass; prevent restricted broker/dealer or customers from
trading; prevent unauthorized access to systems; ensure surveillance personnel receive imme-
diate post-trade execution reports; and be kept in accordance with Rule 17a-4(e)(7) under the
Exchange Act . . .” An Overview and Summary of the Market Access Rule (SEC Rule 15c3-5),
BETTER LIVING THROUGH CONCURRENCY (Nov. 21, 2013), http://clark.ws/2013/11/21/an-over-
view-and-summary-of-the-market-access-rule-sec-rule-15c3-5.
54. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 Fed.
Reg. 69,792, 69,793 (Nov. 15, 2010).
55. Id. at 69,792.
56. In re Wedbush Sec. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-15913 (June 6, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-73652.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Penalizes Morgan Stanley for Violating Market Access Rule (2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543668817 (last visited Sep.
21, 2015) (announcing SEC’s recent penalization of Morgan Stanley for similar violations to
the market access rule).
57. In re Wedbush Sec. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-15913, at *2.
58. Wedbush Securities and Two Officials Agree to Settle SEC Case (2014), http://www
.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543504806 (last visited Sep. 21, 2015).
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In the Matter of the NASDAQ Stock Market (“Facebook IPO”)
The SEC levied more fines after a Facebook IPO that began in confu-
sion and ended in disaster. Due to a “technical error” in NASDAQ’s operat-
ing system,59 chaos ensued when the exchange’s infrastructure could not
keep pace with the would-be traders of the stock. When the dust settled, it
became clear that NASDAQ’s system had been unprepared for the speed and
volume of activity the IPO drew. NASDAQ rectified the glitch within
twenty minutes after opening, but many of the earlier orders were cancelled,
filled at higher prices, or otherwise modified to the traders’ detriment. In
addition to having unprepared systems, NASDAQ and Facebook also vio-
lated the Market Access Rule during the IPO.60 The SEC chalked up the
event to “poorly designed systems and hasty decision-making” and swiftly
fined NASDAQ $10 million.61
HFT-related errors and negligence can have large-scale market ramifica-
tions. These cases show how regulators are quick to punish trading platforms
when poorly facilitated HFT activity causes visible market instability. To be
fair, there are limited opportunities for these platforms to perform “quality
control” tests on HFT algorithms during the trading process. The Market
Access Rule is one regulatory measure designed to give some of the respon-
sibility for quality control to the brokerage firms providing otherwise un-
checked access to HFTraders, but it is uncertain whether the Rule can do
enough to effectively alleviate the burden on trading platforms.
ii. Market Manipulation
Market manipulating strategies are prohibited by a number of existing
securities laws.62 However, enforcement actions against market manipulators
are relatively uncommon. The challenge in bringing such actions is that it
can be very difficult to distinguish between HFT market strategies that are
competitive and those that are manipulative.63
59. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook IPO: What the %$#! happened?, CNN MONEY (May
23, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/23/technology/facebook-ipo-what-went-wrong.
60. Jacob Bunge, Nasdaq to Pay $10 Million Over Handling of Facebook, WALL ST. J.
(May 29, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732486690457851323089222
1350 (“Nasdaq violated its own rules [by taking a large, and ultimately profitable,] short posi-
tion to help address the problems with the debut . . . Other rules also were broken, including
the proper ordering of trades, a basic principle of U.S. exchanges [and a requirement of the
Market Access Rule].”). In addition to the SEC’s fine, NASDAQ also paid $62 million in
compensation to the brokers who took losses during Facebook’s IPO.
61. Id. (quoting George Canellos, co-director of the SEC’s division of enforcement).
62. The charges in Athena were brought under Section 10(b)(5) of the Exchange Act.
Section 9 of the Exchange Act also prohibits manipulation of security prices. Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
63. Fischel and Ross’s definition of manipulation might be of some assistance in carv-
ing carefully between the two descriptors (in HFT settings). Manipulation, in a legal sense,
might be found in “profitable trades made with ‘bad’ intent,” where (1) the trading is intended
to move prices in a certain direction, (2) the trader has no belief that the prices would move in
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In the Matter of Athena Capital Research (“Athena”)
In Athena,64 the SEC found that an HFT firm, Athena Capital Research,
was illegally manipulating end-of-day market clearing prices.65 Athena
structured a trading strategy over the last ten minutes of the trading day that
used its HFT capabilities to artificially drive up the closing price of a stock.
Using this strategy, Athena was able to sell large positions at inflated prices.
Athena eventually paid a $1 million fine to atone for its malfeasance.
United States v. Coscia (“Coscia”)
In a rare criminal case, a U.S. Attorney’s Office filed criminal charges
against a HFTrader, Michael Coscia, for multiple counts of commodity fraud
and spoofing.66 Coscia devised HFT programs that would place misleading
quote orders and then execute trades on the opposite side of those orders
after the market reacted to the false orders. Coscia’s program was designed
to immediately cancel any of the spoofed orders if they were filled.67
These cases illustrate that regulators in the U.S. generally only step in
when market participants cross existing legal boundaries. These enforcement
actions are not novelties in capital market regulation; the novelty is that they
target HFTraders. While current securities laws impose some restrictions on
HFT, a technological revolution like HFT should be accompanied by pru-
dent and decisive changes to the market structure. The next section will dis-
cuss the response of foreign regulators to such a challenge.
B. Implementing MiFID II in the European Union
In October 2014, the European Parliament formally adopted a revised
version of its Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID II”) that
will go into effect in each member state in January 2017. MiFID II is a
legislative framework for European Union (“EU”) member states’ regulation
of financial instrument trading and includes new HFT-related provisions.68
this direction but for the trade, and (3) the resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s
ability to move prices and not from his possession of valuable information. David R. Fischel &
David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 503, 510 (1991).
64. In re Athena Capital, SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-16199, at *5 (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-73369.pdf.
65. Athena was settled only after five years of investigation and the discovery of smok-
ing gun emails. See In re Athena Capital, at *3 (quoting emails between Athena managers
cautioning each other to “make sure we don’t kill the golden goose” and referring to their
secret strategy as “meat and gravy”).
66. Indictment, United States v. Coscia, No. 14-CR-551, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50344
(N.D.I.L 2014 Apr. 16, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ndil/
legacy/2015/06/11/pr1002_01a.pdf [hereinafter Coscia Indictment]; Harris & Leising, supra
note 39.
67. Coscia Indictment at *6.
68. See Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/mifid-ii (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
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MiFID II guidelines require HFTraders to test and monitor algorithms
and to have procedures in place to minimize the risk that their automated
trading activity leads to market abuse. MiFID II also requires HFTraders to
register and gain authorization to use HFT techniques, as well as to abide by
new trading regulations like a harmonized “tick size regime.”69
A “tick size” is the increment in which stocks can be traded, such as one
cent ($7.00, $7.01, $7.02) or one-eighth ($7.00, $7.125, $7.25). Prior to
MiFID II, EU regulators allowed exchanges to set minimum tick sizes to
their own preferences; such a system, however, led trading platforms to
compete for trader affection by lowering their tick sizes.70 MiFID II resolves
concerns about this race to the bottom by allowing the European Securities
and Markets Authority to draft tick size standards that are reflective of “the
price of a financial instrument but also calibrated in a way [to] reflect the
liquidity profile of a financial instrument and the average bid-ask spread.”71
In essence, the EU tick size will be flexible to the price range of individual
stocks in order to strike a balance between a tick size so small that traders
compete solely on price and a tick size so large that traders compete solely
on speed.72 Policymakers state that, through changes like tick size harmoni-
zation, MiFID II will “level[ ] the playing field” to bring fairness to the
markets.73
1. United Kingdom
The London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) is the largest European ex-
change.74 The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), an independent non-
governmental body that replaced the former Financial Services Authority,
has regulated the LSE and the British financial services industry since April
2013. In regulating the LSE, the FCA pursues the statutory objectives of
69. Council Directive 2014/65 arts. 48, 49, 2014 O.J. (L 173/349) (EU). Article 49
states that tick sizes must be “calibrated to reflect the liquidity profile of the financial instru-
ment in different markets” and individually adapted to each financial instrument; see Mark
Buchanan & Liesbeth Baudewyn, Trade Size Changes Coming to Europe, CREDITSUISSE (Oct.
2, 2014).
70. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., Tick Size Regulation: Costs, Benefits, and Risks 3 (Aug. 31,
2012) (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/289037/12-1068-eia7-tick-size-regulation-costs-benefits.pdf.
71. Sandra Bramhoff, Impact of Regulation : MiFID II – Tick Sizes, BEST EXECUTION,
http://www.bestexecution.net/viewpoint-impact-regulation-mifid-ii-tick-sizes-sandra-bramhoff
(last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
72. See id.
73. See Nis Jul Clausen & Karten Engisig Sorensen, Reforming the Regulation of Trad-
ing Venues in the EU Under the Proposed (MiFID II) – Leveling the Playing Field and Over-
coming Market Fragmentation? 5 (Nordic & European Company Law, Working Paper No. 10-
23, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2021079.
74. See Top 10 Stock Exchanges in the World, WORLD STOCK EXCHS., http://www
.world-stock-exchanges.net/top10.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
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protecting consumers, maintaining and promoting effective market competi-
tion, and preventing unlawful behavior in the financial markets.75
In contrast to the relatively cautious American attitude towards HFT, the
United Kingdom (“UK”) seems to encourage HFT activity.76 The UK’s 2012
Treasury report recommended against many of the regulatory strategies
adopted in the U.S.77 While the report acknowledged that some changes (like
circuit breakers or minimum tick sizes) would likely increase market stabil-
ity, it cautioned against potential regulation involving minimum resting
times, cancellation fees, changes to maker-taker models, or switching to call
markets.78
In 2013, the FCA showed a rare burst of action in fining Michael Cos-
cia—the HFTrader charged with spoofing in United States v. Coscia—for
placing false orders on a British exchange.79 The FCA explained that the
unprecedented penalty reflected the severity of the “impact and nature of the
market abuse.”80
British industry participants and lawmakers have pushed back on MiFID
II’s restrictive approach,81 preferring the current regulatory structure, which
is a combination of exchange-led monitoring and industry reporting.82 While
some in the UK resist any new HFT restrictions, however, MiFID II’s immi-
nent arrival has forced them to look for new policies that balance UK objec-
tives with MiFID II compliance.83 The FCA’s Director of Markets, David
75. Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, §§ 1A-1E (Eng.).
76. The CEO at the FCA described the regulatory approach to present in the UK as
“technology neutral,” adding that “it is important to take a step back, and reflect on automated
trading coolly and not get carried away by headlines.”  Wheatley, supra note 7.
77. See GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets
15 (Oct. 23, 2012) (U.K.), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk /assets/foresight/docs/computer-
trading/12-1086-future-of-computer-trading-in-financial -markets-report.pdf.
78. See id. at 13-14.
79. Huw Jones & John McCrank, U.S. and UK fine high-speed trader for manipulation,
REUTERS (July 23, 2013), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-britain-fca-hft-idINBRE9
6L0G620130722.
80. Final Notice to Michael Coscia, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/
static/documents/final-notices/coscia.pdf (last visited July 22, 2015).
81. Much of this pushback can be found in the House of Lords’ EU Economic and
Financial Affairs Sub-Committee’s oral and written evidence report entitled Getting it Right
for the City and EU Financial Services Industry. 12 June 2012, Parl Deb HL (5th ser.), availa-
ble at hhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/28/28.pdf. In this
report, academics and market leaders argue against a number of MiFID II provisions—such as
increasing market-making obligations of HFT liquidity providers and regulator-determined,
instead of exchange-set, order-to-trade ratios—and articulate a more general belief that MiFID
simply “does not understand what high-frequency trading is.” Id. at 9.
82. Wheatley, supra note 7 (noting the MiFID II-driven changes to come, including
significantly reducing lit-pool equities trading and preparing the industry for the increased
regulatory oversight of previously unregulated financial instruments).
83. See id.; see also David Lawton, Dir. of Markets, Fin. Conduct Auth., Address at the
FCA MiFID II Conference 2014 (Sept. 19, 2014) (“[I]mportant questions remain about how
this is done, and in particular how to increase transparency without reducing liquidity – the
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Lawton, summarized the UK’s trajectory in a speech to his countrymen:
“[W]e have to now develop a balanced regime that doesn’t throw our mar-
kets back into the technological dark-ages, but ensures they are fair and safe
for all users in the future.”84
2. Germany
Unlike the UK’s slow acceptance of MiFID II, Germany has readily
embraced the future of more restrictive HFT regulation. In May 2013, the
German Financial Supervisory Authority (“BaFin”) passed the progressive
High-Frequency Trading Act (“HFTA” or “Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz”).
HFTA closely tracks the EU provisions in MiFID II and aims to bring Ger-
many’s antiquated financial market into the modern electronic age. Market
analysts and observers consider it to be stricter and more comprehensive
than other HFT-targeted national regulations.85
While much of HFTA is in line with the MiFID II’s requirements, it also
contains elements that distinguish it from other HFT legislation, such as in-
creased supervisory requirements, excessive order fees, and minimum tick
sizes.86
Pursuant to HFTA, BaFin now requires the registration of HFTraders,
which are defined as traders that use latency-reducing infrastructure, auto-
mated order decision-making and execution, high trading and order volume,
and proprietary trading.87 As of late 2014, no firm had applied for an HFT
license in Germany.88 This occurrence is indicative of one of two conclu-
sions—either no trading participant met the BaFin criteria for an HFT firm,
or, more likely, firms matching the BaFin criteria have changed their trading
behavior or left for less regulated markets to avoid the registration
requirement.89
granularity of application of the rules, the calibration of thresholds for large in scale, and
publication delays and the definition of ‘liquid’ instruments are key components of the think-
ing that must now be done.”).
84. Lawton, supra note 83.
85. See Germany’s HFT ‘Solution’ Should Be Adopted by MiFID II, Says Prop Trading
Group, MARKETS MEDIA (Sept. 18, 2012), http://marketsmedia.com/germanys-hft-solution-
should-be-adopted-by-mifid-ii-says-prop-trading-group; Christian Voigt, What You Need to
Know Before Buying a German Car, REGULATION MATTERS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://regulation
.fidessa.com/2012/10/02/what-you-need-to-know-before-buying-a-german-car.
86. See Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz [High Frequency Trading Act] §§ 2(d), 17, 26(b)
(2014), http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetz/hft_en.html?nn=2821360#
Start.
87. Id. at § 2(a)(4)(d).
88. Martin Haferkorn & Kai Zimmermann, The German-High Frequency Trading Act:
Implications for Market Quality 3 (Goethe University Frankfurt Paper, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2514334.
89. Id.
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C. Japan
The Japanese financial market has welcomed the growth of HFT with
open arms. In 2010, the Tokyo Stock Exchange introduced “Arrowhead,” a
high-speed trading system.90 Two years later, a merger between Japan’s two
major stock exchanges gave Japan title to the third largest exchange in the
world.91 In 2014, Japan built high-speed trading routes between Tokyo, Sin-
gapore, and Chicago to facilitate the growth of HFT.92
Similar to the U.S., Japan regulates exchanges and prohibits fraudulent
transactions like market manipulation and insider trading.93 Though Japan
holds HFTraders accountable under existing securities regulation, scholars
doubt the functional enforceability of such regulation.94 Japan may be less
concerned about the dangers of HFT than the EU and U.S. because HFT
strategies are simply less effective in the Japanese equity market.95 The stock
exchange merger in 2012 left Japan with essentially one exchange, resulting
in an environment that lacks the fragmentation so profitably exploited by
HFTraders in other markets.96
D. China and Hong Kong
Although HFT is not explicitly banned by China or Hong Kong, the
major stock exchanges in those jurisdictions are among the least HFT-
friendly in the world.97 Hong Kong traders are bound by a large stamp duty
(i.e. a 0.1% tax on the sale or purchase of stocks) that renders HFT prohibi-
tively expensive.98 In China, government regulators have tried to curb specu-
lative trading by banning day-trading (i.e. purchasing and selling a stock
90. HFT Comes to Japan, MARKETSMEDIA (May 16, 2013), http://marketsmedia.com/
hft-comes-to-japan.
91. Masaaki Iwamoto & Toshiro Hasegawa, Tokyo Exchange Merges With Osaka to
Form World’s No. 3, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2013-07-15/tokyo-exchange-merges-with-osaka-to-form-world-s-no-3.
92. Holly Bell & Harrison Searles, An Analysis of Global HFT Regulation: Motivations,
Market Failures, and Alternative Outcomes 19 (Mercatus Center, Working Paper No. 14-11,
2014), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Bell_GlobalHFTRegulation_v2.pdf.
93. Nicole J. Ramsay, Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforcement, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. S255, S256-57 (1992).
94. Id. at S255 (contending that “[a]lthough the securities regulations in Japan are vast
and broad, enforcement problems still remain.”).
95. See Yuji Nakamura & Toshiro Hasegawa, Humans Lose Out as Robots Take Tokyo
Stock Exchange, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
03-05/robots-take-tokyo-as-high-frequency-equity-infiltration-hits-70-.
96. Id.
97. See Bell & Searles, supra note 92, at 20-23.
98. Stamp Duty Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 117, 1, Sched. 1, Head 2 (H.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/90E292
D8C26F596C482575EE003E6865/$FILE/CAP_117_e_b5.pdf.
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within the same day) and by prohibiting daily cancellations of more than
1000 orders.99 These policies make profitable HFT impossible.
Recently, however, China has shown willingness to engage in interna-
tional trading with foreign capital through the creation of the Shanghai-Hong
Kong Stock Connect—an unprecedented pipeline allowing investors in
Hong Kong to trade “directly”100 with investors in China.101  Regardless, the
de facto HFT ban currently remains in place for both China and Hong Kong.
Insiders such as Alexa Lam, former Deputy CEO of the Hong Kong Securi-
ties and Futures Commission, however, predict that China will alter its regu-
latory structure to accommodate HFT in the future—a trajectory Hong Kong
will likely follow.102
III. DOMESTIC AND TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY HFT REFORM
Just like the U.S. macroeconomy, all of the securities markets oper-
ate within a “structure” of rules, technology, market practices, and
other constraints that establish the boundaries for interactions be-
tween buyers and sellers.
It is important to recognize that this “structure” does not just mean
regulation, but also the much more complex interaction among reg-
ulation and other factors like competition and technology. . . .
[O]ur work on market structure is never finished – the speed with
which technology and markets change makes that impossible – in-
stead, we must always be focused on what in our market structure
can be improved for the benefit of investors and companies.103
The varied approaches of financial regulators across the globe show that
regulators understand that HFT, similar to technological advances that have
99. China Rising: Innovation and Growth in Its Markets, AUTOMATED TRADER (2012)
at 89, available at http://www.automatedtrader.net/articles/sponsored-articles/137325/china-
rising-innovation-and-growth-in-its-markets.
100. “Directly” is not literal because the nature of the Stock Connect’s directness is rela-
tive to previous prohibition of cross-border trades. The pipeline is not perfectly direct because
trades must pass through clearinghouses on both sides of the China-Hong Kong border before
entering the apposite exchange.
101. See generally Saikat Chatterjee & Michelle Chen, China ETFs Shrivel as Shanghai-
Hong Kong Stock Link Heats Up, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/04/23/china-etf-idUSL4N0XK1TO20150423.
102. Interview with Alexa Lam, former Deputy Chief Exec. Officer, H.K. Sec. & Futures
Comm’n (Apr. 15, 2015); see also Amy Li, Shanghai to Trial Same-Day Trading, WALL ST. J.
(Nov 11, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/11/11/shanghai-to-trial-same-day-trad-
ing (discussing the SSE’s forthcoming rescission of the “T + 1 trading rule” to more closely
align Chinese equity markets with modern international practices).
103. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the Economic Club of New York: Intermedi-
ation in the Modern Securities Markets: Putting Technology and Competition to Work for
Investors (June 20, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13705
42122012.
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changed many traditional industries, is here to stay. It is equally clear that
there is little agreement on how to properly regulate HFT. This Section pro-
poses a two-part solution that aims to embrace the advantages of technology
in the financial industry and unify transnational regulation to create a truly
global market.
A. Implementing Domestic Reforms
As many nations have already concluded, abolishing HFT outright is an
inadvisable route. In the face of crippling regulation, HFTraders might sim-
ply move to friendlier waters (so long as they exist) and take their liquidity
with them. The next section discusses how the structure of the market should
be changed to best minimize HFT-related market instability while retaining
HFT market benefits.
1. Curtailing the “Race to Zero”: Realigning Incentives
to Balance Price and Speed
Currently, the fastest HFTraders are the most profitable. This reality has
resulted in the “race to zero”—the goal of continually reducing latency to
the universe’s natural limits.104 Although scholarly research has yet to pro-
vide conclusive proof that HFTraders with speed-based incentives harm the
market, recent experience with market volatility suggests otherwise105 If,
however, HFTraders could be incentivized to trade on the best prices, the
risks of market harm would likely diminish. This section explores several
potential policy changes that would refocus incentives to best-price trading.
i. Implementing Variable Tick Sizes
Regulators and exchanges set tick sizes for the purposes of simplifying
the trading process, lowering transaction costs, and promoting liquidity.
Originally, U.S. equity markets traded in eighths—$0.125. Exchanges first
“broke the eighth” by transitioning to a sixteenths trading structure in
104. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability of the Bank of England, Address
at the International Economic Association Sixteenth World Congress: Race to Zero (July 8,
2011), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r110720a.pdf (noting that zero latency will be
reached when trading converges “on its natural (Planck’s) limit, the speed of light”); see also
Patterson, supra note 16.
105. Scholars come out on both sides of this debate. Compare Elaine Wah & Michael P.
Wellman, Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation, and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model 12
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://web.eecs.umich.edu/srg/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/twomarketmodel
.pdf (discussing the harmful effects of latency arbitrageur), with Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon
Saar, Low-latency trading, 16 J. FIN. MARKETS 646 (2013) (concluding that “low-latency ac-
tivity need not work to the detriment of long-term investors”). See also Mark Buchanan, High-
Frequency Traders Need a Speed Limit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.bloom-
bergview.com/articles/2015-01-25/high-frequency-traders-need-a-speed-limit.
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1997,106 and in 2001, the equity market switched to “decimalization,” or
penny pricing. The SEC promulgated Reg NMS in 2005 as a way to mod-
ernize the market. Reg NMS Section 612’s “sub-penny rule” imposes a min-
imum tick size of one cent, meaning that the tick size cannot be smaller than
a penny.107 There have been calls within the U.S. markets to change the sub-
penny rule by increasing or decreasing the minimum tick size, or removing
the minimum altogether.108
The nascent EU approach should be carefully considered as a model for
domestic tick size reform. The MiFID II directive dictates that tick sizes
must be flexible to appropriately match the price ranges of individual
stocks.109 A standard tick size of one cent might be too large for a $1 share
(leaving traders to compete solely on speed) and too small for a $500 share
(resulting in competition solely on negligible price differences). Though this
approach would be more complicated to implement than the sub-penny rule,
once in place it would not be difficult to maintain.
ii. Moving from a Continuous Market to a Call Market
In a continuous market, a trader can buy or sell stocks at any instant
during the trading day.110 Because trades are executed in the order they enter
the market, faster traders can advantage their position through technical arbi-
trage. Equity markets trade on a continuous market design where trades are
made on a rolling basis, first at the best price and then in the order they are
received.111 When matching buy and sell orders, exchanges must check other
trading platforms to ensure each order trades at its best price.112 Because this
106. Though Congress’s “Common Cents Pricing Act of 1997” bill unsuccessfully
sought to establish the penny as the price increment in the U.S. stock market, it served as the
impetus for the NYSE to finally switch from eighths to sixteenths—the last major exchange to
do so.
107. Reg. NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 496.
108. Compare Chen Yao & Mao Ye, Tick Size Constraints, High-Frequency Trading,
and Liquidity (Jan. 15, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2478216 (arguing that a decrease in tick size will better allow non-HFTs to compete with
HFTs on price), with David Weild et al., The Trouble With Small Tick Sizes (Sept. 2012),
available at http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%
20capital%20markets/Trouble_Small_Ticks.pdf (contending that high tick sizes would provide
adequate economic incentives will bring back the small IPO and generally boost the economy).
See also David Weild at al., The Trouble With Small Tick Sizes (Sept. 2012) (suggesting issu-
ers of stock have the authority to completely customize the tick size with which it is traded).
109. Article 49 of MiFID II.
110. Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race:
Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response 1 (Chicago Booth Paper No. 14-13,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478216.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Regulation NMS dictates that price is the most important consideration in a trade.
This assertion is gleaned through the “trade-through rule,” because an order submitted to the
market must pass through the various trading platforms until it meets the best price available,
subject to some exceptions. The effect of this rule is that investors can no longer execute trades
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“check and match” activity does not occur instantaneously, a window opens
for HFTraders with lower latency to practice arbitrage. If an order hits one
platform and does not find the best price, it must quickly bounce to the
others. While the order checks other exchanges, efficient HFT arbitrageurs
can quickly purchase that stock at the very best price and turn it around in a
sale at the next best, slightly higher price. This arbitrage has the effect of
inflating the stock price for the original buy order, which has to complete its
order at that next best price.
One mechanism for disrupting the race to zero would be to switch from
a continuous market to a call market. In a call market, market-wide orders
would be executed in batches at fixed intervals.113 As a consequence, all of
the orders placed during the finite clearing intervals can be more effectively
matched on price before execution.114 By eliminating the value of a micro-
scopic speed advantage, such a structure would focus competition on price,
and give traders time to react to the environment and informational cues
within the call period.115 Call markets with batch execution are also com-
putationally simple for exchanges—and thus easy to implement—because
each batch can be computed in a designated block of time.116
To discourage traders from attempting to game the batch system, each
batch could be executed at random intervals within pre-determined limits
(e.g. between 25 and 50 microseconds).117  A short batch interval would still
reward technological investment that results in an ability to respond quickly
to new information and market shifts while negating the more predatory uses
of low latency strategies.118
If regulators impose a call market design on equity market trading, some
uncertainty will remain as to how a call market exchange would function
alongside continuous markets or other exchanges.119 While it would be sim-
at an inferior price for any reason, including: certainty of execution, preference of exchange,
non-displayed liquidity, available capital at a broker-dealer, or concerns about confidentiality.
See Marshall E. Blume, Competition and Fragmentation in the Equity Markets: The Effects of
Regulation NMS 11 (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Paper No. 02-07, 2007), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=959429.
113. See Budish et al., supra note 110, at 1, for a full study on the potential benefits of
switching from a continuous order system to a frequent batch auction market. See also Wah,
supra note 17.
114. See Wah & Wellman, supra note 105, at 3.
115. Budish et al., supra note 110, at 46, 50.
116. Id. at 55 (noting that, in contrast, the existing continuous limit order books design
must be computed on a rolling basis as orders are executed on a continuum – leading to
potential backlog and delay).
117. See Ginger Szala, Will High Frequency Trading Force a Market Redesign?, AD-
VANTAGE FUTURES, (July 10, 2014) http://www.advantagefutures.com/will-high-frequency-
trading-force-a-market-redesign.
118. Id.
119. See Sviatoslav Rosov, Are Frequent Batch Auctions a Solution to HFT Latency
Arbitrage?, CFA INSTITUTE BLOG, (Nov. 10, 2014), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketinteg-
rity/2014/11/10/are-frequent-batch-auctions-a-solution-to-hft-latency-arbitrage.
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ple to bypass this problem and require all exchanges to use frequent batch
auctions, this solution would be difficult for regulators to impose and would
certainly be more well-received if it were voluntarily adopted by the indus-
try. Such a system might be less disruptive if phased in slowly, rather than
adopted in full simultaneously.
Whether  adopting a call market or retaining a continuous one, regula-
tors could implement an additional policy that allows for order bundling.
Order bundling lets traders place large orders that must be fulfilled across
multiple exchanges in such a way that no partial execution of that order is
published until the whole order is complete, effectively preventing HFT or-
der anticipation.120
2. Transaction Taxes or Fees
Another potential method of reigning in HFT would be the imposition of
a transaction tax.121 An effective tax could place beneficial restraints on
HFT—by curbing speculative trading, reducing market volatility—while
also raising revenue. As seen in Hong Kong, however, a heavy transaction
tax could eliminate HFT altogether.
One option would be a very small transaction tax. Economist James
Tobin, who first proposed a financial transaction tax in 1978, likened the
effects of such a tax to “throw[ing] some sand in the wheels of our exces-
sively efficient international money markets.”122 The benefits of implement-
ing a transaction tax would be: (1) uniformity across trading platforms and
(2) the elimination of the exchanges’ tax exemption loopholes.123 Ideally,
such a tax would push investors towards developing genuine long-term in-
vestment strategies, rather than short-term speculative strategies.124
120. Adler, supra note 36, at 197.
121. See Matt Prewitt, High-Frequency Trading: Should Regulators Do More?, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 131, 160 (2012); Algirdas Šemeta, EU Commissioner for Taxa-
tion, Customs Union, Anti-Fraud, Audit and Statistics, Address at the Meeting of Members of
the Finance and Fiscal Committees in the Danish Parliament: Financial Transactions Tax: The
Way Ahead (Mar. 19, 2012); see also Jared Bernstein, The Case for a Tax on Financial Trans-
actions, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/opinion/the-case-
for-a-tax-on-financial-transactions.html.
122. James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153,
154 (1978).
123. The latter consideration is especially important because exchanges often build ex-
emptions into their fee structures that favor their largest traders under the guise of building a
fairer market. For example, NASDAQ exempts market makers from its Excessive Order Fee
under the auspices that “market makers are already subject to rule-based standards designed to
promote the efficiency and quality of their order entry practices.” Nasdaq SEC Proposed Rule
Change Filing, No. 34-70117, 6 n.10 (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
sro/nasdaq/2013/34-70117.pdf.
124. See John Fullerton, High-frequency Trading is a Blight on Markets that the Tobin
Tax Can Cure, THE GUARDIAN: ECONOMICS BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012, 7:42 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/apr/04/high-frequency-trading-markets-tobin-
tax-financial-transactions-algorithms.
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While implementing a transaction tax could curb speculation, it would
likely have a negative impact on market liquidity. Italian financial authori-
ties have promulgated a version of a “Tobin Tax.”125 The Italian HFT tax is
only collected when the ratio of cancelled to executed orders exceeds 60
percent in a trading day,126 yet still a number of Italian firms relying on HFT
have found the tax to be negatively impactful on their trading operations.127
Critics warn that this Italian field experiment is evidence that even a well-
intentioned transaction tax could hinder market liquidity.128
Another option would be to impose a fee on traders who place orders
without the intent to execute them. Regulators could infer such intent from
the immediate cancellation of large orders or the pricing of orders so far
outside of the National Best Bid and Offer range as to be impracticable to
trade upon, designating these orders as “impermissible.” Some exchanges,
such as NASDAQ, have already imposed such a fee—termed “excessive
order fees”—upon their market participants, citing the rationale that
“[m]arket participants that flood the market with orders that are rapidly can-
celled or that are priced away from the inside market do little to support
meaningful price discovery.”129 The uniform imposition of such a fee would
ostensibly end illicit activities like spoofing and quote stuffing because the
submission of large, unexecuted orders would become prohibitively expen-
sive. On the other hand, it could potentially discourage order cancellations
that are an innocuous part of normal trading. An experimental use of this fee
would allow regulators to determine if cancelled or exorbitantly priced or-
ders are always reflective of market manipulation, without permanently chil-
ling the market.
3. Increasing Obligations for Proprietary Traders
One area ripe for regulatory improvement is the Market Access Rule. As
discussed previously, the Market Access Rule directs the SEC and/or
125. France implemented a tax of 0.01% of qualified transactions, while Italy’s tax is
0.05%. Bell & Searles, supra note 92, at 24; Vittorio Salvadori di Wiesenho & Roberto Egori,
2013 Italian Financial Transaction Tax, DERIVATIVES & FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 49 (2013),
available at http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/2013%20Italian%20Financial%20
Transaction%20Tax.pdf.
126. Salvadori di Wiesenho & Egori, supra note 125, at 60.
127. Mike O’Hara, European FFT, German HFT Act, MiFIR, MAR Whats It All About?,
THE TRADING MESH (May 28, 2013, 3:21 AM), http://www.thetradingmesh.com/pg/blog/mike/
read/92444. Other scholars have also noted the overall decrease in liquidity apparent in both
French and Italian markets. Bell & Searles, supra note 92, at 38, 41.
128. See Ben Wright, Call It Whatever You Like, but a Financial Transaction Tax is Bad
News, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/bank-
sandfinance/11071422/Call-it-whatever-you-like-but-a-financial-transaction-tax-is-bad-news
.html.
129. Order Approving NASDAQ Proposed Rule Change Relating to Routing of Order,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-70117 (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/
2013/34-70117.pdf.
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FINRA to supervise the firm, and the firm, in turn, must supervise the unre-
gistered traders using its MPID.
In addition to FINRA’s new registration rules,130 regulators could fur-
ther combat HFT’s potential market destabilizing effects by imposing fiduci-
ary-like obligations on all market makers, including proprietary traders using
HFT strategies. The judiciary already recognized that market makers must
assume special obligations in return for the unprecedented access and power
they have within the financial market.131 Simply placing a fiduciary duty on
market makers, however, would be unworkable because proprietary HF-
Traders do not have their own customers.132
Instead, HFTraders could be required to hold their positions during peri-
ods of market duress, rather than being allowed to immediately exit the mar-
ket. Studies have found that HFT was not the cause of market disasters like
the Flash Crash and the Knight Capital loss.133 HFT has, however, been im-
plicated as a contributor to the sudden and extreme subsequent withdrawal
of liquidity from the market in the aftermath of such events.134 Without ac-
cess to liquidity, a quick recovery from a small market hiccup can be
stymied, leading to broader market losses. If HFTraders are required to hold
positions during times of duress, liquidity will remain in the market and a
complete crash might be avoided.135
4. Increasing Technological Investment to Enhance Monitoring
and Market Transparency
A primary goal articulated by regulators is to increase transparency and
oversight within capital markets.136 The SEC has taken a step in this direc-
130. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
131. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 n. 16 (1980) (“Congress . . .
recogni[zed] that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they
exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of buy and sell orders.”);
Clement v. SEC, 674 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In return for undertaking . . . special
obligations to the market, market makers enjoy advantages not available to others.”).
132. A broker-dealer’s standard of care when providing investment advice to investors is
governed by FINRA Rule 2111’s suitability standard: a broker-dealer is required to “have a
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended [security or investment] strategy . . . is suitable
for the customer.” FINRA R. 2111 (2012).
133. Jeremy Grant & Philip Stafford, Studies Say No Link Between HFT and Volatility,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011, 1:22 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/38452490-da07-11e0-b199-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3gdTwf2Il.
134. See Michael Mackenzie & Telis Demos, Fears Linger of New ‘Flash Crash’, FIN.
TIMES (May 5, 2011, 6:23PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d18f3d28-7735-11e0-aed6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3gdTwf2Il.
135. SECURITIES INDUSTRY & FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, IMPACT OF HIGH FRE-
QUENCY TRADING AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHANGE 4-9 (2011) (outlining increased effect of
computer-based trading on extreme market movements during times of market stress due to
the sheer volume and speed of algorithmic reactions).
136. SEC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018 3 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/
about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf.
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tion by adopting a rule to create a consolidated audit trail—a data project
that will enable regulators to monitor trades and risk on the market in real
time.137 The rule requires self-regulating organizations—exchanges and
members of FINRA—to collect and report market trading data to the SEC.138
But while information collection is an important first step, it is worthless if
the SEC cannot analyze it effectively.139
If a consolidated audit trail is to be meaningful, it must analyze data in
real time effectively enough to detect illegal HFT activity and distinguish
predatory from competitive tactics. As HFTraders create and update algo-
rithms to respond to the market in real time, the SEC must invest in similarly
advanced technology. An obvious difficulty is the expense associated with
such technological investment. The building of the SEC’s consolidated audit
trail alone is estimated to cost between $350 million and $1 billion.140
The solution might be to simply accept that software engineers of such
caliber are in high demand and agencies should find a way to offer competi-
tive rates of compensation. If matching these salaries is not feasible,141 agen-
cies could outsource algorithmic engineering. Financial industry insiders
working as contractors could be an affordable way for regulators to create
and maintain effective monitoring technology.
B. Setting International Standards for HFT
As the national financial markets become increasingly more global, the
implications of an uncoordinated approach to HFT regulation grow larger
and more far-reaching. By acknowledging the securities market as a global
network, perhaps even to the point of being a single financial system, domi-
nant nations like the U.S. might be able to sway newer HFT entrants—such
as Russia, Mexico, and China—to adopt basic provisions for automated
137. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722, 45,722 (2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 242). In 2010, the SEC also built a program known as MIDAS—“Market Informa-
tion Data Analytics System.” Ahead of the consolidated audit trail, MIDAS is currently utiliz-
ing public data to analyze information regarding the orders and trade executions on the
national exchanges, as well as all off-exchange executions. See Elisse Walter, Chair, SEC,
Speech at American University School of Law: Harnessing Tomorrow’s Technology for To-
day’s Investors and Markets (Feb. 19, 2013); but see Letter from R. T. Leuchtkafer to Eliza-
beth M. Murphy, Secretary of the SEC (May 15, 2014), available at http://blog.themistrading
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Leuchtkafer_MIDAS.pdf (considering MIDAS’s limita-
tions, such as only collecting public information, not accounting for canceled trades, etc.).
138. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722, 45,722 (Aug. 1, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
139. After five months of effort, the SEC was able to piece together trading data needed
to understand the events behind the twenty-minute Flash Crash in 2010. The necessary infor-
mation was at the analysts’ fingertips, yet the conclusion was much further away.
140. Scott Patterson & Bradley Hope, Bidders for SEC’s CAT System Narrowed to Six
from 10, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2014).
141. See Emily Lambert, High-Frequency Programmers Revolt Over Pay, FORBES (July
28, 2010).
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trading in their national exchanges and off-market platforms. For example, if
all HFTraders must register with a financial regulator, there will be fewer
incentives for firms to seek friendlier, unregulated waters in other
jurisdictions.142
Although there are no internationally-shared HFT standards, many na-
tions have common securities regulation goals, such as protecting investors,
ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and reducing sys-
temic risk.143 A set of international standards would encourage national regu-
lators to unify their approaches to HFT regulation, much as the U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) and the International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) did for corporate financial
reporting.144
A journey towards global HFT regulation undoubtedly leads to a “who’s
in charge of global finance” problem.145 The International Organization of
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) is one international regulatory organiza-
tion that could take the lead on creating a set of global HFT standards.
IOSCO has not yet spoken specifically to HFT activity, but it has identified
risks of algorithmic trading and recommended ways to minimize such risks.
The IOSCO Consultation Report states that trading venues should draft
“business continuity plans” incorporating controls for errant algorithmic oc-
currences, such as pre-trade controls, circuit breakers, and kill switches.146
IOSCO further advises intermediaries—including clearing firms—to have
adequate “operational and technical capabilities” to effectively manage the
risks posed by their clients with direct electronic access to the market.147
Any global regulatory system should first standardize a definition for
HFT activity in order to best facilitate effective regulation and monitoring.148
A standardized global definition would prevent HFTraders from simply flee-
ing the jurisdiction to avoid the registration requirement (recall the BaFin
142. This is obviously a gross generalization of such a provision’s outcome. Many firms
might still look to be registered in other nations with softer regulators or still be incentivized to
find a way to be “unmonitored.” The unlimited potential for other outcomes would not be fully
realized until a treaty began to be negotiated or discussed.
143. See generally Bell & Searles, supra note 92.
144. GAAP are a marriage of policy-driven standards and the set of commonly accepted
ways of recording and reporting accounting information. See generally FEDERAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD, Authoritative Sources of Guidance, http://www.fasab.gov/ac-
counting-standards/authoritative-source-of-gaap.
145. See generally Michael Barr, Who’s in Charge of Global Finance, 45 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 971 (2014) (outlining the challenges in infusing legitimacy and accountability into the
global financial regulatory structure).
146. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MECHANISMS FOR TRADING VENUES TO EFFECTIVELY
MANAGE ELECTRONIC TRADING RISKS AND PLANS FOR BUSINESS CONTINUITY 27-34 (2015),
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD483.pdf.
147. Id. at 20-23.
148. One option would be adopting the strict European parameters for HFT activity in
MiFID II, discussed supra in Part II.B.
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situation). Next, a global regulatory system should adopt two early mea-
sures: stress testing protocols and HFT registration. Global standards should
encourage regularly conducted stress testing of trading platforms to ensure
that they have the stability to endure algorithmic catastrophes without crash-
ing.149 Global standards should also outline and standardize HFT firm regis-
tration requirements. Though the capital markets would remain a primarily
self-regulating industry, required registration would pave the way for super-
visory authorities to investigate reports of illicit HFT activity.150 Setting up
an avenue for more effective monitoring will allow regulators to learn more
about the effects of HFT and tailor future regulation accordingly.
Above all, global standards need to be flexible to adapt to the evolution
of HFT strategies. Broad global standards would work in conjunction with
the domestic recommendations in Part III.A to improve the immediate stabil-
ity of the U.S. capital markets. Implementing call markets or imposing dis-
tressed-market obligations on HFTraders would also be effective elements in
a set of global HFT principles. Like GAAP and IFRS, a clear set of interna-
tional standards could evolve as the market learns more about the real im-
pact of HFT and eventually become a set of standards that is uniformly
adopted at domestic levels.151
CONCLUSION
Many industry observers caution against an expansive approach to HFT
regulation. Proponents tout increased liquidity, lower transaction costs, in-
creased efficiency in price discovery, and smaller spreads as positive ramifi-
cations of a HFT-driven market. Critics of HFT have equally plausible
concerns regarding HFT activity’s negative effects on market integrity,
transparency, stability, and fairness.152
149. Such stress testing might include the following measures already recommended by
IOSCO: (1) doubling the number of orders and executions compared to a regular trading day;
(2) doubling the peak volumes observed for a period; (3) tripling the current maximums exper-
ienced in current production; (4) testing volume of 130% of volume traded the previous two
years; and (5) testing ten times the current trading volume when developing new algorithms
and systems. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MECHANISMS FOR TRADING VENUES TO EFFEC-
TIVELY MANAGE ELECTRONIC TRADING RISKS AND PLANS FOR BUSINESS CONTINUITY 22
(2015), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD483.pdf.
150. But cf. Nan S. Ellis et al., The NYSE Response to Specialist Misconduct: An Exam-
ple of the Failure of Self-Regulation, BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 102, 145 (2010) (arguing that a
system of self-regulation is untenable for effectively managing modern market misconduct).
151. See generally Stephen A. Zeff, Evolution of US Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) (2005), available at http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/resource/0407zef-
fusgaap.pdf (outlining the evolution and development of GAAP from the 1930s to present
day).
152. See Scott Patterson, Mark Cuban: High-Frequency Traders Are the Ultimate Hack-
ers, WALL ST. J.: MARKETBEAT (June 26, 2012, 4:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/
2012/06/26/mark-cuban-high-frequency-traders-are-the-ultimate-hackers; see also Bell &
Searles, supra note 92, at 24.
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With studies and pontifications from across the industry supporting both
sides of the debate, the conclusion is that the long-term effects of HFT are
not yet known. Accordingly, some observers advocate for a hands-off ap-
proach to HFT: no HFT-targeted regulation.153 Others recommend a con-
servative “wait-and-see” period before implementing potentially restrictive
regulations, hoping to guard against the risk of a regulatory overreaction.154
The HFT question, however, comes in the wake of a global financial
crisis after which regulators and industry participants were criticized for a
complete failure to diagnose and react to a brewing storm. Uncertainty as to
the effects of HFT in financial markets should not be cited as the reason for
declining to adjust market structure and regulation. Regulators have many
options for expanding HFT regulation to better protect markets and inves-
tors. Regulators must not placidly accept the current market structure as im-
mutable. Instead it should be tested for its flexibility and regularly reworked
to better serve a market of evolving technology.
153. See e.g., Tim Worstall, Adam Smith Explains Why High Frequency Trading Doesn’t
Need to be Regulated, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
timworstall/2015/03/30/adam-smith-explains-why-high-frequency-trading-doesnt-need-to-be-
regulated.
154. See Holly Bell, Beyond Regulation: A Cooperative Approach to High-Frequency
Trading and Financial Market Monitoring, CATO INSTITUTE, 6 (Apr. 8, 2015).
